Gazprom’s Grip: Russian Energy Leverage and Moldova’s Response

Moldova’s gradual shift away from Russian energy dependency has become a defining factor in its political and strategic realignment. For many years, Gazprom’s control over Moldova’s gas supply functioned as a tool of leverage, reinforced by its majority stake in Moldovagaz and the unresolved status of Transnistria.

By late 2024, however, Moldova had substantially reduced its reliance on Russian gas and strengthened its integration with European energy infrastructure. As the country enters a new governing term under the pro-EU Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), led by Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu, it approaches the next stage of its European trajectory not as a state constrained by Moscow’s energy grip, but as one actively consolidating its independence. How was this shift achieved — and what lessons does it offer for states facing coercive energy leverage? Our latest case study examines the decisive years that reshaped Moldova’s energy security landscape.

A Sword of Damocles over Moldova

For many years, Moldova relied heavily on Russian natural gas supplied by Gazprom through Moldovagaz, a company in which Gazprom holds a majority stake of over 50%. This gives the Russian company – and by extension the Russian state – significant leverage over Moldova’s energy infrastructure. 

Transnistria, a separatist region within Moldova under strong  Russian influence , consumes most of the imported gas – much of which is subsidised by Moscow. This has translated into a mounting debt: Transnistria alone has accumulated $11 billion, while Moldova’s portion stands at $709 million. Chișinău, however, disputes this figure, citing a 2023 audit that places its actual debt at $ 8.6 million.

Whenever a government with closer ties to Russia is in power in Chișinău the natural gas prices are typically lower and the debt treatment more lenient.

As Moldova tries to reintegrate the separatist region, Russia claims that Moldova thus has the obligation to take on Transnistria’s debt. Whenever a government with closer ties to Russia is in power in Chișinău the natural gas prices are typically lower and the debt treatment more lenient. This dynamic began to shift in 2021, when President Maia Sandu and her parliamentary majority signaled a clear pro-EU direction. From that point forward, the threat of energy retaliation remained an ever-present constraint on Moldova’s strategic decision-making.

Contractual Dependence and the Gas Supply Crisis (2021–2022)

In 2021, stalled contract negotiations with Gazprom triggered a gas supply crisis in Moldova, forcing the country to purchase gas at soaring prices from other European countries. Securing a new deal with Gazprom was seen as the most affordable way to avoid a full-blown gas crisis, and by October 2021, a five-year deal was reached. However, it required Moldova to conduct an audit on its debt to Gazprom and to negotiate a payment schedule. Adding to this, Moldova could not restructure or unbundle Moldovagaz without Gazprom’s consent, postponing any potential gas market reforms. 

With the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Gazprom began to show its displeasure with the Moldovan government’s support for Ukraine through price volatility.

With the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Gazprom began signalling its displeasure with the Chișinău’s support for Ukraine through price volatility and further supply reductions. In addition, Gazprom also set out to remind the country that it had missed the deadline for auditing its debt and that it was late on the monthly payments, implying that gas deliveries could consequently be halted. The underlying message was clear: unless Moldova aligned itself financially — and implicitly, politically — Moscow could shut turn of the tap at will.

Strategic Decoupling and Political Pressure (2022–2024)

By November 2022, flows were further reduced by Gazprom. In response, Moldova made a pivotal decision: it ceased purchasing Russian gas for its own consumption, allocating the remaining reduced flows exclusively to Transnistria.

The government introduced variaty of measures to stabilize the system: the state of emergency continued in place, Energocom (state energy trader) was empowered to look for power and gas abroad, and they secured a limited supply of gas from the Kuchurgan power station in Transnistria which resumed selling gas to Moldova. These three courses of action enabled the country to avoid major winter blackouts.

Pro-Russian political forces sought to exploit rising costs through coordinated street protests, amplified by Russian-backed media framing the situation as popular backlash against the government’s pro-EU direction. Such attempts at destabilization mirrored tactics used by Russia across the wider post-Soviet region. The Sandu’s administration, however, refused to reverse its pro-EU course and responded through anti-disinformation and anti-corruption measures to counter Russian hybrid interference.

By mid-2023, an international audit also concluded that the country’s debt to Gazprom was just 1% of what the company had claimed, $8.6 million, a figure promptly rejected by Gazprom. Soon after, the gas transmission network was unbundled and Moldovatransgaz transferred operational control from Gazprom to Vestmoldtransgaz (owned by the Romanian Transgaz). This signified that the gas transport grid came under an EU-linked operator, bringing Moldova closer to the EU.

This signified that the gas transport grid came under an EU-linked operator, bringing Moldova closer to the EU.

By late 2024, Gazprom was only supplying gas to Transnistria. When the Russia-Ukraine transit agreement, which allowed Russian gas to flow through Ukraine, expired without renewal, Gazprom declared that it would halt all gas supplies. As a result, Transnistria was left with barely any energy supplies. Rather than prompting panic or concessions, the situation compelled the region (out of necessity) to move closer towards reintegration with Moldova.

Moldova’s Response: The Water Passes, but the Stones Remain

Across the period described above, Moldova responded with a level of resilience and consistency that offers a relevant reference point for other states facing similar forms of energy pressure. The government pursued a dual strategy: immediate crisis management to prevent system collapse, and long-term structural reforms to reduce Russian leverage over the energy sector.

Emergency Measures and European Solidarity

The government used extraordinary powers to allocate funds for energy procurements through Energocom, which purchased spot-market cargoes from EU suppliers and shifted toward alternative fuels to conserve gas. In 2022, together with the emergency measures, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), approved €300 million energy security loan to offset supply disruption and set up strategic gas reserves covering 20% of the country’s annual gas needs. 

Later in the same year, the European Commission provided another 250 million-euros aid package to help Moldova purchase gas. This was a clear sign of Western support for a democracy under siege, which has been further reinforced in 2025, with an additional 1.9 billion euros from the official EU financial support package, Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, comprising 1.5 billion euros in low-interest loans and 385 million euros in grants. 

Diversification of Supply and Structural Reforms

To reduce the need for Russian energy, Moldova started to diversify its natural gas supply routes. The completion of the Iași–Ungheni–Chișinău gas interconnector with Romania  allowed the country to import gas from and via Romania. Additionally, west-to-east gas deliveries into Moldova’s systems were secured through Poland’s PGNiG. 

Beyond the diversification of supply routes, Moldova also led a push for electricity diversification, switching from dependence on the old Soviet power grid to integration with the European one.

Chișinău also undertook major financial and structural reforms. The country set out to reform its internal energy sector to reduce the Kremlin’s energy pressure through structural checkpoints and corrupt legacies within Moldova. By addressing tariffs and subsidies that kept prices artificially low but that in turn created perpetual debt and dependence, the government made  rate increases in line with actual import costs possible, while it offered direct cash support for vulnerable households to purchase energy.

This move ensured that Moldovogaz could pay Gazprom on time while it was still receiving Russian gas, improving the payment discipline while depriving Gazprom of one of its avenues of pressure. Furthermore, the country also unbundled the gas transmission system, which separated gas transportation from distribution, a measure that allowed for free access to the pipeline for all suppliers and removed the conflict of interest that had allowed Gazprom to manipulate pipeline operations to favour its own gas. Beyond the already mentioned independent audit of its debt, which meant that Moldova could no longer be subject to Gazprom’s debt hammer, it sought to improve transparency and reduce corruption in the energy sector to minimise Russian influence that often seeped through shady dealings.

Most recently in August 2025, the Moldovan government ensured that Moldovagaz would not be the country’s supplier of natural gas by revoking its license. The role was transferred to Energocom, the state energy trader, this marked a decisive step in ending Gazprom’s institutional presence in Moldova’s energy infrastructure. Chișinău both curtailed Moscow’s remaining leverage and aligned more closely with EU regulatory requirements in a period when accession negotiations are gaining momentum.

Outlook Forward: Europe

Moldova remains exposed to significant geopolitical risks. Its proximity to both Russia and Ukraine, as well as the unresolved status of Transnistria, continues to shape its strategic environment. Yet by achieving meaningful progress toward energy independence, Moldova has reduced one of the key channels of Kremlin influence and moved further along its path toward European integration. Chișinău applied for EU membership in 2022, and accession negotiations were formally opened at the end of 2023. Earlier this year, the EU pledged additional support to stimulate economic stability and reform, including the €1.9 billion Growth Plan for Moldova, composed of loans and grants. In September, preceding elections that reaffirmed the country’s pro-European trajectory, the first disbursement was released.

The newly formed government has placed EU integration at the center of its governing program, “EU, Peace, Development,” and has set an ambitious target of accession by 2030. While not unattainable, the timeline remains contingent on Moldova’s capacity to align national legislation with the EU acquis and to gradually integrate its economy with the EU single market.

In addition to structural reforms, Moldova faces two key constraints. The future of Transnistria remains unresolved, and any comprehensive EU accession strategy will require a plan for reintegration of the region, which remains economically and politically dependent on Moscow. Additionally, Moldova’s accession process is tied to Ukraine’s, which currently faces its own uncertainty due to potential Hungary’s veto. Finally, progress will also depend on the EU’s institutional ability to accommodate further enlargement – an issue still under negotiation within the Union itself.

What Europe Can Learn from Moldova

Moldova’s recent experience highlights the strategic risks of deep energy dependence on Russia. It demonstrates that Gazprom and other Russian energy companies operate as political instruments, and that contractual stability cannot be relied upon when supply is leveraged for geopolitical influence.

Moldova reduced this vulnerability through a combination of external support, supply diversification, and domestic reform. European Union assistance provided the financial capacity to manage price volatility and avoid systemic collapse. The diversification of gas supply routes and alternative fuels weakened the coercive potential of Russian supply cuts. And structural reforms – including the unbundling of gas transmission and the removal of Gazprom from the domestic supply chain – closed the institutional channels through which Russian influence had been exercised.

Significant challenges remain, including the question of Transnistria’s reintegration and the broader geopolitical uncertainty in the region. Yet Moldova’s progress shows that reducing Russian leverage is possible when crisis response, long-term reform, and international alignment move in concert. Moldova offers not just a warning, but a practical demonstration of the steps required to secure energy sovereignty – and, through it, political independence.

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