Democratic Backsliding in Europe: Rising Political Risks in a Changing Landscape in the CEE region

In recent years, Europe has experienced democratic backsliding, where once-stable democratic institutions are increasingly undermined by authoritarian tendencies. As of mid-2025, this phenomenon has not only persisted but also become more institutionalized in several EU member states. The erosion of democratic norms poses serious challenges to political stability, economic prosperity, and the core values of the European Union.

Democratic backsliding refers to the gradual weakening of democratic governance, such as the rule of law, judicial independence, and civil liberties, by elected leaders.

Tensions Between Hungary and the EU

Hungary remains the most emblematic case of democratic regression in Europe. Under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the ruling Fidesz party has continued to consolidate power. In April 2025, Hungary adopted controversial constitutional amendments that ban public LGBTQ+ events and legally enshrine a binary definition of gender. These changes prompted a strong rebuke from 17 EU member states, who accused Hungary of breaching the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

In another unprecedented move, Hungary became the first EU member to withdraw from the International Criminal Court, raising concerns about its commitment to international norms and accountability.

Although the European Commission released €10.2 billion in cohesion funds in late 2024, approximately €19 billion remains frozen due to unresolved rule-of-law concerns. Hungary continues to score poorly on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index and faces multiple ongoing infringement procedures.

Poland’s Outlook Remains Uncertain

After initial progress following the 2023 election of Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s centrist government, the country’s reform trajectory has slowed. The election of nationalist President Karol Nawrocki in May 2025, an ally of Orbán and former director of Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance, has complicated institutional reform efforts.

While the Polish presidency is largely ceremonial, the office wields a critical instrument of power: the legislative veto. Overriding a veto requires a three-fifths majority in Parliament – a threshold that Tusk’s governing coalition does not currently hold. This dynamic has already constrained key legislative initiatives since Tusk returned to office in late 2023. Nawrocki, like his predecessor Andrzej Duda, is aligned with the opposition Law and Justice (PiS) party. His election signals a continuation of institutional deadlock, with expectations that he will frequently use his veto power to block the government’s priorities, particularly those aimed at restoring judicial independence and advancing rule-of-law reforms.

Political Polarisation Deepens in Bratislava

Since Robert Fico’s return to power in October 2023, Slovakia has introduced a series of measures that align with broader regional trends of democratic backsliding. Key legislative changes include amendments to the Criminal Code, notably the abolition of the Special Prosecutor’s Office, which had overseen high-profile corruption cases under the Specialised Criminal Court. The government has also advanced legislation affecting non-governmental organizations, introducing requirements that critics argue restrict their activities. 

Parallel to these legal changes, efforts to restructure public broadcasting and alter its management have raised concerns about media independence. These developments have coincided with a shift in foreign policy rhetoric, including Fico’s opposition to additional EU sanctions on Russia. Taken together, these steps have prompted public demonstrations and heightened scrutiny over the country’s democratic trajectory.

Czechia’s Political Choices in 2025

The upcoming parliamentary elections in Czechia, scheduled for October 2025, are seen by some as a key test for the country’s democratic continuity and a potential inflection point for political dynamics in Central Europe. Former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš and his party ANO are widely expected to win, consistently polling around 30%. Unless an extraordinary event occurs, this trend is likely to hold.

However, the challenge lies in post-election coalition building. ANO will almost certainly lack a parliamentary majority and will need to rely on coalition partners – many of whom may demand significant concessions. Potential allies include STAČILO!, a left-leaning electoral alliance that includes the Communist Party; Motoristé, a right-leaning party led by MEP Filip Turek; and SPD, currently polling third. Among them, SPD poses the greatest risks as a potentially unreliable and ideologically divergent partner.

An alternative scenario would see Babiš forming a minority government – a strategy he previously employed from 2017 to 2021. In either case, it is highly likely that Babiš will set the tone for Czechia’s political direction in the coming years.

Political Risks and EU Fragmentation

Beyond Visegrád Group, political tensions are rising as Romania’s Constitutional Court annulled the 2024 presidential runoff, triggering widespread unrest and raising serious concerns about electoral integrity and trust in democratic institutions. 

Democratic backsliding threatens not only individual states but the broader political and institutional stability of the European Union. A key concern is the growing erosion of EU unity. In 2025, Hungary leveraged its veto power to block critical elements of the EU’s proposed €2 trillion Multiannual Financial Framework (2028–2034), particularly funding provisions tied  to pro-Ukraine measures.

Political instability also impacts investor confidence and economic performance. In countries like Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, uncertainty around judicial independence, media freedom, and EU sanctions has created a more volatile investment climate. Social unrest, evident in both Slovakia and Romania, has further strained public trust and government legitimacy.

From a geopolitical perspective, democratic backsliding weakens Europe’s ability to present a united front against external threats. Slovakia’s resistance to new sanctions against Russia highlights how internal fragmentation can be exploited by foreign powers seeking to undermine the EU’s global influence.

The EU’s Response: A Balancing Act

The EU faces a tough balancing act: how to push back against democratic backsliding without overstepping its authority or deepening divisions with member states. While Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union technically allows for suspending a country’s voting rights in the Council of the EU and the European Council, it’s been largely ineffective, requiring unanimous approval that’s nearly impossible to achieve.

Instead, the EU has turned to financial pressure. Through the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation introduced in 2020, the Commission can freeze funds when a member’s actions threaten the proper use of the EU budget. This tool has been used cautiously, but Hungary has faced the most serious consequences so far. Slovakia has also come under closer scrutiny following the launch of an investigation into potential fraud involving EU regional funds.

In 2025, the European Commission proposed strengthening this mechanism in its draft of the next long-term EU budget. Under the new proposal, nearly all cohesion and agricultural funding would be subject to annual democratic performance reviews.

The European Parliament has supported this approach. In its 2025 Rule of Law Report, the Parliament called for greater transparency, an expansion of conditionality to new funding instruments, and the creation of independent oversight bodies to assess violations impartially.

Supporting civil society and maintaining open dialogue are key to defending democracy in the long run. By backing independent media, human rights groups, and grassroots movements, the EU helps citizens hold governments accountable. At the same time, open communication between EU institutions and national governments can ease tensions and create space for reform. 

Financial conditionality, linking EU funds to respect for democratic standards, has become a core tool in this effort. When used carefully and consistently, it can deter backsliding without harming citizens. Its success, however, depends on clear rules, strong coordination, and the political will to follow through.

Conclusion

Democratic backsliding is no longer a fringe concern, it strikes at the core of what the European Union stands for. From Hungary’s authoritarian shift to growing instability in Poland, Slovakia, and Romania, the EU faces a serious test of its unity and values.

Meeting this challenge means taking action: enforcing democratic standards, supporting civil society, and making sure EU funding is tied to the principles it was built on. As the next budget cycle approaches, there’s a real opportunity to turn values into action.