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Czech Parliamentary Elections 2025: Can Babiš Turn Victory Into Lasting Power?

  • Oct 1
  • 7 min read
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The Czech Republic enters its 2025 parliamentary elections in an atmosphere of expectation and unease. Polls suggest Andrej Babiš is poised to once again lead his ANO movement to victory. What is less clear is what that victory will translate into: a workable government, a fragile minority, or a protracted deadlock.


Babiš Set to Win, but Faces a Coalition Maze

Current projections indicate that ANO could win around a third of the vote, leaving it short of the 101 seats needed for a majority in the two-hundred-seat Chamber of Deputies. The centrist Spolu alliance, composed of ODS, KDU-ČSL, and TOP 09, is running a distant second, while smaller parties such as STAN, the Piráti, the far-right SPD, and the left-wing coalition Stačilo! are competing in the single or low double digits. 


All pro-EU parties from the current governing coalition (Spolu, STAN) as well as the Piráti have explicitly ruled out cooperation with ANO. This narrows Babiš’s coalition options to just three potential partners: SPD, Stačilo!, and the right-wing Motoristé Sobě. In practice, this means that even if Babiš secures a clear lead in votes, his ability to form a stable cabinet will hinge on potential partners, whose demands introduce both political complications and internal tensions.




The High Cost of Partnering with SPD

ANO’s most likely coalition partner, the SPD, would face challenges in delivering a majority. Even if the two parties were to join forces, their combined projected total would not likely reach the 101 seats needed to govern. Much will depend on whether the Motoristé or Stačilo! manage to cross the 5% threshold required to enter parliament. If both fail, Babiš and Okamura could theoretically form a fragile government on their own, but its stability would be at risk from the outset. 


Challenges are further compounded by the strong personal animosity between Babiš and Okamura, which could undermine coalition cohesion from the start. 

Coalition with the SPD would come at a steep political cost. SPD is openly Eurosceptic and sympathetic to Russia, with leader Tomio Okamura advocating for a referendum on EU membership and strict anti-immigrant policies. The party has also signaled it would seek powerful ministries, such as the Interior and Defense, to push its agenda. These challenges are further compounded by the strong personal animosity between Babiš and Okamura, which could undermine coalition cohesion from the start. 


Other Potential Partners in Babiš’s Coalition Puzzle

Beyond SPD, Babiš could turn to the Stačilo! alliance and to the Motoristé party. At the European level, Motoristé leader Filip Turek and ANO are aligned through their shared membership in the Patriots for Europe group in the European Parliament. The party has expressed clear willingness to join an ANO-led coalition and appears to be among Babiš’s preferred partners, though its actual role will depend on whether it secures parliamentary representation.


Motoristé has expressed clear willingness to join an ANO-led coalition, though its actual role will depend on whether it secures parliamentary representation.

Stačilo! presents another potential option for Babiš. Its campaign platform, however, departs sharply from ANO’s positions, combining far left-wing priorities such as higher taxes on wealth with anti-establishment proposals including a referendum on EU membership. Strategically, Stačilo! may find greater advantage in remaining outside government to consolidate its position as a growing political force. However, the group is likely to provide external support for a Babiš-led minority government if needed.


Strategically, Stačilo! may find greater advantage in remaining outside government to consolidate its position as a growing political force.

Both Stačilo! and Motoristé face electoral uncertainty. Higher voter turnout could mirror the dynamics of the 2021 election, when SOCDEM and Přísaha all narrowly failed to reach the 5% threshold. A similar outcome would limit Babiš’s coalition options and further strengthen SPD’s leverage in post-election negotiations.


Survival Through Bargaining

If coalition talks with SPD and other potential partners collapse, a minority ANO government remains a plausible option – either alone or with support from a single additional party. Czech political history shows that minority cabinets can survive, but they do so precariously. Every key vote in parliament becomes a test of survival. Such governments rely on ad hoc bargaining with small parties or individual MPs, often resulting in weak compromises and constant instability.

If coalition talks with SPD and other potential partners collapse, a minority ANO government remains a plausible option.

On top of that, Andrej Babiš has a significant reason to fear post-election chaos. His likely coalition partners, such as SPD and the Stačilo! are not cohesive parties but rather loose alliances of diverse figures and small factions. Their internal fragmentation and ideological inconsistencies would make any government – whether minority-led or nominally majority – highly fragile. Even if such an arrangement delivered the numbers on paper, its durability would remain doubtful, vulnerable to defections and recurring internal conflicts over conflicting platforms.


“Anti-Babiš” Forces Weakened Ahead of Election

Another possible scenario is the revival of an anti-Babiš coalition, the “five-party bloc” of Spolu, STAN, and the Pirates, which successfully kept ANO out of power in 2021. Reproducing that coalition will be harder today: the parties are polling weaker, and their popularity has been eroded by the political costs of governing. 


Barring an unexpected electoral twist, revival of the current governing coalition remains highly unlikely.

Current projections place their combined seat count below the majority threshold, effectively blocking their path to forming a government. Their only realistic chance would be to consolidate their voting base at the last minute while one or two of Babiš’s potential partners – Stačilo! and/or Motoristé Sobě – fail to cross the threshold required to enter parliament. Such an outcome would hinge on unusually high voter turnout and, barring a last-minute political upset, remains highly unlikely.



Conflict of Interest Casts Shadow Over Election Outcome

Adding to the political uncertainty is the unresolved issue of Andrej Babiš’s conflict of interest over his control of conglomerate Agrofert. Czech law prohibit holding political office while owning more than 25% of a company receiving state or EU funds. Babiš transferred Agrofert into trust funds to bypass this rule, but Czech courts and EU institutions argue he still exercises de facto control and benefits improperly from public subsidies.


President Petr Pavel has asked legal experts to assess whether the conflict of interest could bar Babiš from returning as prime minister. In a recent meeting with the president, Babiš pledged to address the issue but offered no details. The matter therefore remains unresolved, raising the possibility that even if ANO wins the most seats, the president could delay or withhold Babiš’s appointment.

One theoretical workaround would be for Babiš to cede the prime minister’s role to another ANO figure, most likely Karel Havlíček.

One theoretical workaround would be for Babiš to cede the prime minister’s role to another ANO figure, most likely Karel Havlíček. However, this option – reminiscent of Jarosław Kaczyński’s arrangement in Poland – is fraught with problems. Even if Havlíček were formally appointed, Babiš would almost certainly retain influence behind the scenes and is unlikely to give up a position he intends to reclaim for himself.


A Tilt to the East? Foreign Policy Under ANO

Foreign policy under Babiš appears increasingly questionable, shaped not only by his own shifting rhetoric but also by the profile of his potential coalition partners. In his previous term, he maintained pragmatic ties with Germany and France while quietly cultivating links with Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. In opposition, his rhetoric has hardened, openly aligning with Orbán and Austria’s Herbert Kickl through the co-founding of the Patriots for Europe group in the European Parliament, which unites hard-right and Eurosceptic parties.

Babiš’s pragmatic streak and reliance on EU funds will ultimately prevent any radical departures from current foreign policy.

This shift signals that Czechia could step back from its role as a reliable EU partner. However, Babiš’s pragmatic streak and reliance on EU funds will most likely ultimately prevent any radical departures from current foreign policy. More plausibly, ANO will pair sharp domestic criticism of Brussels with cautious accommodation in EU decision-making, punctuated by disputes over enduring priorities such as the Green Deal, immigration, and EU voting rules.


ANO will pair sharp domestic criticism of Brussels with cautious accommodation in EU decision-making, punctuated by disputes over enduring priorities such as the Green Deal, immigration, and EU voting rules.

At the same time, ANO has consistently rejected outright EU or NATO withdrawal and does not back referendum proposals promoted by its potential partners. It does, however, support constitutional provisions enabling national referendums, leaving open the possibility of future political manoeuvring.


Domestic Policy: Short-Term Gains, Long-Term Risks

On the domestic front, an ANO-led cabinet would likely prioritise tax reductions and credits, opposition to new “green” levies, expanded state control in the energy sector, and the reinstatement of selected social benefits. ANO has pledged to lower corporate tax from 21% to 19% and gradually reduce personal taxation, financing the gap by targeting the grey economy. It also promises cheaper energy by blocking climate-related charges on households and transport, while consolidating state ownership of ČEZ to bolster energy security.


Coalition partners such as SPD, Motoristé, or Stačilo! would push policy further toward populism. All oppose EU climate measures, entrenching resistance to the Green Deal. SPD and Motoristé align with ANO’s low-tax stance. Stačilo! would demand progressive taxes, higher wages, and energy regulation, creating friction with ANO’s business-friendly agenda. The common thread is scepticism toward EU climate policy, opposition to EURO and weak commitment to fiscal discipline, raising the risk of short-term, unsustainable measures.


The common thread is scepticism toward EU climate policy and weak commitment to fiscal discipline, raising the risk of short-term, unsustainable measures.

As in his previous tenures, Babiš is likely to capitalise on Czechia’s relatively strong economic standing within the EU while deferring the costs of populist measures – passing the consequences of policy inaction to the future. Overall, ANO’s and other parties’ economic programmes rest more on ambitious pre-electoral promises than on a coherent strategy for governing after the election.


Conclusion

The 2025 Czech elections are set to deliver Andrej Babiš and ANO a clear victory, but converting that win into stable governance will be far more challenging. With current coalition parties refusing cooperation, Babiš’s coalition options are limited to ideologically incompatible and politically costly partners such as SPD, Stačilo!, and Motoristé Sobě.


Even if a government is formed, its durability would be highly uncertain, shaped by internal divisions and competing agendas. The real test of this election will not be Babiš’s victory at the polls, but whether he can assemble a coalition strong enough to survive beyond its first major crisis.


Abroad, Czechia is unlikely to undergo radical foreign-policy shifts, but a Babiš government would likely revive a dual track: sharp Eurosceptic rhetoric and selective obstruction abroad balanced by pragmatic compliance where economic interests are at stake. Domestically, policy is set to favour short-term populist measures, while deferring structural reforms, heightening long-term fiscal risks.


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