Buying Out ČEZ: What Is Really Behind Fico’s Nuclear Power Play?

The Slovak government plans to acquire ČEZ’s 49% stake in Slovak Nuclear Energy Company (JESS), leaving the Slovak state as the company’s sole owner. The proposed transaction has, however, become a source of growing controversy. At the centre of the dispute is the approximately €190 million valuation of ČEZ’s stake by EY, which Economy Minister Denisa Saková has refused to approve without further independent scrutiny – putting her openly at odds with Prime Minister Robert Fico.

Yet the price itself is only part of the story. Why is Fico pushing so hard to complete the acquisition, why does he want ČEZ out of the game after almost two decades of cooperation, and why is control over JESS becoming a political issue now? The answer appears to lie in what comes next: the planned construction of a new nuclear power plant at Jaslovské Bohunice, estimated by the government to cost between €12 and €15 billion.

The €190 Million Dispute

Minister Saková has so far refused to sign off on the purchase of ČEZ’s 49% stake at the valuation prepared for the Slovak government by EY. She deems the approximately €190 million price too high and disadvantageous for Slovakia. Similar concerns have been raised by Slovakia’s Value for Money Unit, opposition politicians and multiple experts. Much of the public debate has focused on the difference between the approximately €190 million market valuation prepared by EY and the considerably lower accounting value of ČEZ’s stake of €100 million in 2024. 

The difference alone does not demonstrate that the transaction is overpriced. The larger problem is transparency – the full report has not been disclosed citing commercially sensitive information. The Ministry of Economy subsequently sought another assessment from Rothschild & Co, but JESS failed to provide the company with all the information required to complete it, raising further questions about the transparency. Shareholders of ČEZ and JAVYS (the Nuclear and Decommissioning Company, exercising the state’s shareholder rights in JESS) have since agreed to jointly select another firm to prepare an additional valuation.

The new assessment is a partial concession to Saková. Fico cannot simply remove her from the equation: he could propose her dismissal to President Peter Pellegrini, but his approval is effectively off the table given Saková’s position in HLAS and Pellegrini’s continued ties to the party he founded. This gives Saková considerable room for manoeuvre in what has become an unusually open confrontation with the prime minister.

Pellegrini's political backing gives Saková room for manoeuvre in what has become an unusually open confrontation with the prime minister.

Fico’s other alternative is to transfer the administration of the state’s stake in JAVYS from the Economy Ministry to the Government Office, but that requires cabinet approval – something he has already failed to secure twice.

Fico Moves to Consolidate Control

This may appear to be a dispute over which institution formally manages a state asset. In the case of JESS, however, the stakes are much higher. JESS is expected to prepare the new nuclear source at Jaslovské Bohunice. According to current government estimates, the project could eventually cost €12–15 billion, making it one of the largest investments in modern Slovak history. The institution controlling the state’s shareholder rights in JESS will therefore sit directly above a company through which increasingly large project decisions will pass.

JESS is expected to prepare the new nuclear source at Jaslovské Bohunice, estimated to cost €12–15 billion.

This puts Fico’s attempts to move control closer to the Government Office in a different light. Moving the shareholder rights away from Saková’s ministry and towards the Government Office would bring the project closer to the political centre controlled by the prime minister. Specifically, under Juraj Gedra, head of the Government Office and a close Fico ally currently charged with public-procurement manipulation, and Peter Liška, the Government Commissioner for the Development of Nuclear Energy, who previously worked for VUJE, one of the key contractors in Slovakia’s state nuclear sector.

Saková has her own incentives in the dispute. HLAS-SD has lost significant support since the 2023 election, making both the party’s future and her own political position less certain. Her resistance may serve several purposes: distancing herself from the disputed valuation, limiting her exposure to the project and, according to some, extracting political concessions within the coalition. HLAS has nevertheless already signalled willingness to transfer authority to the Government Office, making the move increasingly likely.

Is ČEZ Buyout Strategic?

Is removing ČEZ actually beneficial for Slovakia? The idea of building a new nuclear source at Jaslovské Bohunice together with the Czech energy company dates back to Fico’s government in 2009 and continued under successive governments. The first clear push to buy ČEZ out came only after Fico returned to power in 2023, without a convincing public explanation for why the ownership model suddenly became unacceptable. ČEZ has also never publicly indicated that it wants to leave the project.

Keeping the Czech company involved has clear operational advantages. ČEZ has extensive expertise and is currently developing new nuclear capacity at Dukovany, giving it relevant experience in permitting, procurement, financing and project management. Buying it out would not necessarily make the project easier to deliver. The only advantage of the buyout is control: key decisions in JESS currently require the agreement of both shareholders.

The strategic case for the buyout rests less on cost or expertise than on giving the Slovak government complete control over JESS.

But full ownership comes at a significant cost. Slovakia would pay around €190 million for ČEZ’s stake and then inject roughly €300 million to continue the project, despite already strained public finances. The strategic case for the buyout therefore rests less on cost or expertise than on giving the Slovak government complete control over JESS.

Why the Rush?

If full control is the objective, timing becomes crucial. Slovakia is due to hold parliamentary elections in roughly a year, and the current coalition is far from certain to return to power. If Fico wants ČEZ out of JESS and the nuclear project firmly underway before then, his window is limited. Several coalition representatives have already voiced opposition to the buyout.

The plant itself will not be built before voters return to the polls, but important commitments can already be made. Ownership can be consolidated, preparatory work launched and the project granted strategic-investment status, which would accelerate permitting and other administrative procedures. The Economy Ministry has so far resisted granting that status before the ČEZ buyout, arguing that doing so could increase the value of the Czech company’s stake.

The faster the state acquires ČEZ’s shares, the faster these steps can proceed. One important deadline has already been met: on 21 August, the application for a land-use decision was submitted, avoiding a potential delay of up to two years. Despite earlier setbacks, the project therefore remains broadly on track.

Timing Favours ČEZ

Based on the current trajectory, the buyout is likely to take place this autumn. Fico’s September deadline may slip while the second valuation is prepared, but a substantial reduction from the proposed €190 million appears unlikely. A modest downward adjustment could help ease the controversy without fundamentally changing the transaction.

The political obstacles on the Slovak side are also weakening. Saková and HLAS have signalled willingness to transfer authority over the project to the Government Office, reducing the likelihood of further internal blocking. ČEZ, meanwhile, negotiates from a position of strength. It did not initiate the sale and knows the Slovak government is determined to acquire its stake before the project moves forward. It therefore has little incentive to accept a significantly lower price.

The main downside for ČEZ could be reputational. Allegations that the valuation was deliberately inflated or agreed in advance have appeared in the Slovak political and media debate, but remain concentrated mainly among opposition politicians and parts of the domestic media. Even if the transaction closes near €190 million, its overall financial impact on ČEZ is likely to remain limited, with the sale generating an estimated accounting gain equivalent to about CZK 3.9 per share and potentially providing additional headroom for dividends.

Summary

• The €190 million buyout is primarily about control. Acquiring ČEZ’s 49% stake would give Slovakia full ownership of JESS, which is preparing a €12–15 billion nuclear project at Jaslovské Bohunice.

• The valuation remains the main immediate obstacle. Economy Minister Denisa Saková has challenged EY’s assessment, while a second review failed due to missing data. A new independent valuation is now being prepared.

• Control is shifting closer to Fico. HLAS has signalled support for moving administration of the state’s JAVYS stake from the Economy Ministry to the Government Office, bringing oversight of the nuclear project closer to political circle controlled by the prime minister.

• The strategic case for removing ČEZ is not clear-cut. Slovakia would lose an experienced nuclear partner, pay around €190 million for its stake and subsequently inject roughly €300 million into the project. 

• Timing strengthens ČEZ’s position. With elections roughly a year away, Fico is under pressure to settle ownership and advance the project. ČEZ faces no comparable deadline, making a major reduction from the €190 million valuation unlikely.

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